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Suffering from the eurocrisis and enlargement fatigue, the
EU’s influence on Serbia and Kosovo is on the wane.
by Blog Admin
In recent years, the EU has had a great deal of influence on the Balkans, particularly
through its close involvement in Kosovo. However, as Philip Cunliffe  notes, the EU is now
suffering from the effects of the economic crisis and has little appetite for enlargement. The
EU’s declining power in the region, and the removal of any incentives for progress toward
EU accession, may mean that the Serbian government has more freedom to act
independently toward Kosovo. 
On the one hundredth anniversary of  the Balkan Wars, the states of  the Balkans are
once again conf ronted with an indebted, decaying and decadent empire whose f ragmentation threatens
their f uture and the stability of  their region. Yet this t ime round, the Balkan states, whether singly or
collectively, have been less avid in seeking ways to exploit imperial decline and f ragmentation.
The crisis of  the European Union draws to a close a distinctive period of  post-Cold War polit ics in the
Balkans – a period def ined by the paradigm of  transit ion (f rom Stalinist one-party rule and command,
state- led economies) and the paradigm of  integration (into Euro-Atlantic institutions through NATO and
EU expansion). These paradigms have now exhausted their appeal, and whatever comes next will have to
take into account the impact and legacy of  the ongoing crisis.
The regional dimensions of the crisis 
It is obvious to say that the crisis of
the European Union has had multiple
ramif ications f or the region – most
notably, the extent to which it damages
the standing of  the Union as a whole.
The depth and duration of  the
economic crisis has shattered the
image of  the Union as a global haven
of  ever-growing prosperity. The social
struggles and polit ical controversies
unleashed by austerity policies have
damaged the image of  the Union as the
realm of  technocratic, post- ideological
stability and gentle, persistent social
improvement. What is worse, the
punishing economic austerity regimens
inf licted on the smaller, debt- laden
economies of  the Union (particularly
the Mediterranean economies closest
to the Balkan states), as well as the
corresponding elevation of  the Union’s major powers over its smaller powers, has also called into
question the magnetic appeal of  the EU to smaller and poorer states such as those of  the Balkans.
Finally, the much-vaunted ‘enlargement f atigue’ of  the Union – already well-entrenched bef ore the global
f inancial crisis struck – combined with the prolonged crisis of  the eurozone / Union, has eviscerated
whatever lingering expansionist instincts there were in the major capitals of  Europe. With the f inal ref lex
spasm of  enlargement, which will likely see the accession of  Croatia next year, we are witnessing the
close of  a distinctive phase of  the post-Cold War lif e of  the Union, and with it a whole vision of  polit ics
both internal and external, f or the states of  the region.
Imperial weakness?
In the interim, the question is raised as to the polit ical will and material capacity of  theUnionto continue
to play an imperial role in the Balkans. A premonition of  imperial retreat may have been witnessed in the
Union’s cutting of  f unding to its so-called rule-of - law of  mission in Kosovo, Eulex, and the dissolution
of  the International Civilian Of f ice in September 2012. This slackening of  the protectorate might prompt
Kosovo’s polit ical elite into taking init iatives independent of  Brussels, particularly given that they are
under pressure f rom the increasingly inf luential Vetëvendosje! opposition movement in parliament,
goading them into giving content to their otherwise empty proclamations of  independence.
The tightness of  the Union’s grip over the region is usually justif ied by ref erence to the necessity of  a
f irm hand to ensure the reduction of  nationalist conf lict, in order to stave of f  the possibility of  f urther
disintegration. Yet the Union has played a key role in precipitating such conf lict – both in the early days
of  the collapse of  Yugoslavia(helping to instigate war with its recognition of  secessionist states), while
also impeding conf lict settlements in its conf used responses to the wars of  Yugoslav secession. The
Union’s need to inf luence and shape polit ics throughout the region as a whole mean that it has by
def ault established strategic and polit ical circuits that interconnect all international relations in the region
with internal and inter-ethnic relations and tensions, radiating f rom Bosnia-Herzegovina through Serbia-
Kosovo down to Macedonia.
Impact on Serbian foreign policy
Serbia’s claims to sovereignty over Kosovo and Kosovo’s struggle to establish itself  as an independent
state mean that the knots of  Balkan polit ics are arguably tangled the most t ightly in the case of  Serbia
and its relations with Kosovo. What is more, the recent electoral victory of  Serbian president Tomislav
Nikolić and his Progressive Party inSerbia’s general elections earlier this year brings to an end a decade
of  Democratic Party hegemony in Serbian public lif e, with its liberal, pro-Western, technocratic vision of
post-Milošević polit ics and f oreign af f airs. All of  these circumstances conspire to make Serbian f oreign
policy of  particular interest and importance across the next f ew years.
One way in which the crisis has been f elt in Serbian f oreign policy is the new government’s recent
statements – such as president Tomislav Nikolić’s speech to his party congress on 29 September – that
it will not be ‘rushing’ to join the Union or immediately pushing f or the release of  an accession date f rom
Brussels. Discussion of  Serbia establishing its own ‘conditions’ to join the Union has also been mooted.
This is mostly empty bombast that simply makes a virtue of  necessity, as the Serbian government would
be unlikely to get such conditions even if  it  was able to articulate what it wanted.
However, in making this claim, the new government is also signalling that the inf luence of  Brussels over
decision-making in Belgrade has waned: the Serbian polit ical class knows that Brussels cannot of f er any
imminent progress towards accession. For the moment, the government is spinning its own lack of
external opportunity as indicative of  Belgrade’s clear-sighted commitment to pursuing the national
interest, in contrast to the self -ef f acement of  the previous government led by the Democratic Party. But
the impulse to this new, more circumspect att itude comes f rom Brussels, not Belgrade.
Where the halt to enlargement might be f elt more is in relations with Kosovo. With no of f ers that
Brussels can make to either the Kosovars or Serbs by way of  accession, the Serbian government has an
incentive to take a more intransigent stance vis-à-vis Pristina – the latter still f acing barriers to its f ull
international recognition by virtue of  its clash with Belgrade. On the other hand, Serbia may yet of f er to
close down or relax its global campaign against recognition of  Kosovo in return f or extracting
concessions f rom Pristina. The current Serbian Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, is also one of  the Serbian
polit ical f igures most closely associated with the idea of  (re)partit ion and / or territorial exchange
between Serbia and Kosovo as a solution to the stand-of f  – a prospect that has consistently drawn the
ire of  Western leaders and policymakers.
All of  which is to say two things: f irst, not to assume that the loosening of  Union inf luence over the
region will necessarily allow explosive nationalist f orces to decompress; and second and more
ambitiously, that the slackening of  the Union’s grip may result in opportunit ies f or local polit ical leaders
to strike agreements hitherto impeded by polit ical and diplomatic restrictions imposed f rom Brussels.
Many of the ideas in this piece were inspired by the discussion at an LSE Ideas workshop on the ‘Balkans in
2020’ held in January 2012. The author is grateful to all the participants of the workshop for stimulating the
ideas behind the arguments in this piece. Responsibility for these arguments, and any errors of judgement,
are his alone. 
Dr Phillip Cunliffe will be speaking at the LSEE lecture “The Balkans Beyond the
European Union: The Case of  Serbian Foreign Policy” on Tuesday, 27
November. Click here for more details.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP
– European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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